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RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR IMWINKELRIED'S COMMENTS
DAVID J. KARP*
I would like to thank Professor Imwinkelried for his perceptive
remarks, which reflect agreement with my suggestions on a basic
point: The current approach to evidence of uncharged acts is unsatis-
factory, and alternatives should be considered. Our area of possible
disagreement is whether the desirable alternatives include the pending
legislative proposal for sex offense cases. Professor Imwinkelried's re-
marks raise five major points:
The first point is characterizing Rule 404(b) as a "compromise"
measure.' However, what's an intermediate approach depends on
what positions one chooses to characterize as the extremes. You
might say that Rule 404 is a compromise in that prosecutors and de-
fense attorneys dislike it for opposite reasons, but splitting the differ-
ence between rival groups of lawyers is not a sound criterion for
formulating rules of evidence.
I think the pending legislative proposal can fairly be character-
ized as a moderate reform measure. It amounts to a kind of codifica-
tion of a tendency that has substantial support in both traditional and
contemporary judicial precedent. It does not repeal Rule 404(b)
across the board; it does not admit evidence of offenses which are
dissimilar in character from the charged offense; and it does not im-
pose a mandatory rule of admission that supersedes the general stan-
dards of the rules of evidence. It also does not have any effect on
cases other than sexual assault and child molestation cases.
On the other hand, Rule 404(b) cannot be characterized as a
"compromise" position on the admission of evidence of the defend-
ant's criminal propensities, because it takes the most extreme possible
* Senior Counsel, Office of Policy Development, United States Department of Justice;
B.A. 1972, Columbia College; Ph.D. 1975, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. 1979, Co-
lumbia University School of Law. This statement, which is a companion piece to Evidence of
Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 Ci.-KFr L. REv. 15
(1994), was presented as part of an address to the Evidence Section of the Association of Ameri-
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[1. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Some Comments about Mr. David Karp's Remarks on Propen-
sity Evidence, 70 Cmn.-KEr L. REv. 37, 38.]
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position on that issue. It categorically bars the admission of evidence
for that purpose, no matter how probative it is.
The second point raised by Professor Imwinkelried's comments is
the comparison to the rules of other common law countries, and par-
ticularly England.2 If we make comparisons to foreign legal systems,
limiting the scope to common law jurisdictions is a skewed approach.
Other foreign systems may be more willing to explore the defendant's
character in criminal trials, and to admit information concerning his
earlier offenses. For example, it is stated that in France, "the history
of the accused, including his criminal record, is read out at the begin-
ning of the trial."'3 This information is provided to the judges and the
jurors4 as a matter of course. In seeking to learn from other countries,
the ones we look at shouldn't be limited to a selected class whose rules
fall near one end of the spectrum.
Getting back to England, the conditions for admitting this type of
evidence are not that restrictive. The recent English decision cited by
Professor Imwinkelried (R. v. P. )5 was a sex offense case involving a
defendant who had been molesting his two daughters. The admission
of the evidence was found to be proper, although the facts were not
unusual for that type of offense. The House of Lords expressly held
that "striking similarity" among the offenses is not required, and dis-
approved lower court decisions which held that "similarity beyond...
the pederast's or the incestuous father's stock-in-trade" is a condition
of admissibility.6 The English rule also does not limit admission to
cases involving any particular number of victims or incidents.7
The third point concerns the tendency of courts in the United
States to adopt a broad approach to admission in sex offense cases. 8 I
have a different impression of the contemporary decisions in this area.
For every recent decision that rejects a principle of broad admission in
[2. Id. at 39-41.]
3. Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh Report-Evidence (General), 1972,
Cmnd. 4991, at 49.
4. See generally Edward A. Tomlinson, Nonadversarial Justice: The French Experience, 42
MD. L. REV. 131, 143-44 (1983) (tribunal in serious criminal cases in France includes three judges
and nine lay jurors); Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Admission of Criminal
Histories at Trial, 22 U. MicH. J.L. Rrs. 707, 751-53 (1989) [hereinafter Histories] (use of jurors
and juries in criminal trials in European systems generally, including decision of European Com-
mission on Human Rights upholding admission of previous convictions "even in cases where a
jury is to decide on the guilt of an accused.").
5. [1991] 3 All E.R. 337.
[6. Id. at 337, 339, 346-48.]
7. See DPP v. Boardman, [1975] A.C. 421,428, 460 (rejecting defense argument that more
than two instances are required).
[8. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 42-43.]
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sex offense cases, there is another one that adopts the principle,
though achieving that result may require contortionist's tricks with
Rule 404(b). I have given a few examples in my remarks, and many
others can be cited. The obstacles to admission are now greater for
the courts, but the inclination to admit the evidence is still there.
The fourth point is inferences from the practices of American
courts in this area.9 Courts in the United States have never been com-
pelled to admit evidence of similar crimes on a broad basis in sex of-
fense cases. If they did not believe that this type of evidence was
more probative than prejudicial, they would not have admitted it.
When one examines the decisions that have adopted special rules for
sex offense cases, they do not say that the protection of possibly inno-
cent defendants must be sacrificed in order to nail sex offenders by
any possible means. Rather, the decisions tend to focus on the proba-
tive value of this type of evidence, and the need to admit it in order to
achieve accurate verdicts.
For example, in State v. Charles L.,10 the Supreme Court of West
Virginia adopted an overt "lustful disposition" exception for child mo-
lestation cases, despite state evidence rule 404(b), and despite earlier
precedent to the contrary." Following a review of the issues of proof
in child molestation cases, the court concluded that "[i]n consideration
of all these factors, the probative value of such testimony far out-
weighs the potential for unfair prejudice.' 2
The fifth point is the import of empirical studies of character.13
However, the case for the proposed rules does not depend on contro-
versial theories about the nature of human character.
Is past criminal conduct predictive of subsequent criminal con-
duct? The point is taken for granted in other contexts. For example,
the defendant's criminal history weighs heavily in pre-trial release de-
terminations and in sentencing decisions, both as a statutory matter
and as a matter of judicial discretion. It often determines whether a
defendant is locked up or set free before trial, and whether he is im-
prisoned for 20 years rather than 5 after conviction. This is primarily
because what a defendant has done in the past is taken as a good
indication of what he's likely to do in the future if not adequately
restrained or deterred.
[9. Id. at 43.]
10. 398 S.E.2d 123 (W. Va. 1990).
[11. Id. at 131-33.]
[12. d. at 133.]
[13. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 43-46.]
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Susan Davies' article, 14 cited by Professor Imwinkelried, differs
with his view of the import of the psychological theories described in
that article. The author rejects the argument that psychological theory
entails the unreliability of character evidence in the form of a few inci-
dents or a single incident. 15 She notes that some legal commentators
have fallaciously argued that such evidence is not probative of con-
duct because one or two observations do not support an inference of
behavioral consistency in varying situations.16 However, she rebuts
this argument by observing that "where situations are similar, past be-
havior is an excellent indicator of a person's likely future behavior.'
17
Davies' article also concludes that contemporary psychological find-
ings do not substantiate the view that character evidence is likely to be
prejudicial.' 8
A more basic response to the alleged uncertainty of predicting
later conduct from earlier conduct is that the objection simply miscon-
ceives the issue. The question is not one of predicting in the abstract
that a person will commit crimes, or of predicting that he will do so in
certain situations. Rather, the question of admission arises where
there is specific non-character evidence that a crime has been commit-
ted, and that the defendant is the one who did it. In sex offense cases,
this normally includes the victim's accusation. The hypothesis of the
defendant's innocence then depends on the possibility that the victim
is lying or mistaken, and that the other evidence of guilt is also false or
misleading.
Presenting the charged incident in isolation from the defendant's
broader course of conduct does not provide the basis for a fair assess-
ment of this possibility. For all the jurors know, they are being asked
to credit charges of heinous conduct against a person who is not crimi-
nally disposed in general, and who has otherwise led a blameless life.
This misleading portrayal of the case can be corrected through
the admission of evidence of similar conduct of the defendant on
other occasions, which tends to show that he is capable of committing
such crimes, and disposed to do so. A defendant's history of sexually
assaultive conduct evidences a willingness to engage in violence to co-
[14. Susan Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27
CRAM. L. BuLL. 504 (1991).]
[15. Id. at 519-20.]
[16. Id. at 519.]
17. See id. at 519-20.
18. Id. at 523-33; see also Histories, supra note 4, at 732-33 (finding that juries are more
likely to acquit than judges though aware of the defendant's criminal record in a large propor-
tion of all cases).
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erce sexual acts. A defendant's history of child molestation provides
evidence that children are within his zone of sexual interest. The
value of this type of evidence in assessing the plausibility of the charge
is not limited to cases involving a strikingly similar series of crimes or
numerous uncharged incidents. How great that value is under the
facts of particular cases is properly a question for the jury.
Finally, I would emphasize the importance of taking account of
considerations of probability in rethinking the rules in this area, as
well as considerations relating to character or propensity. For exam-
ple, the Boardman case in England 19 involved a headmaster who was
soliciting sex from students in his school. The case is often described
as establishing the admissibility of evidence of character in certain cir-
cumstances, but the debate in the case shows reliance on a different
rationale-the improbability that multiple victims would indepen-
dently fabricate similar stories. Inferences relating to probability are a
distinct and equally important rationale supporting the admission of
evidence of similar crimes. Analyses that fail to take account of this
point are overlooking half of the issue.
19. DPP v. Boardman, [1975] A.C. 421.
1994]

